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RobertDahl and theRightto
WorkplaceDemocracy
RobertMayer
Do employeespossessa moralrighttodemocratic
voiceat work?InA Preface
ToEconomic
and otherwritings
overthepasttwodecades,RobertDahl
Democracy
has developeda neo-Kantianprooffortheexistenceof such a right.Even ifwe
acceptthenormofdistributive
justiceuponwhichDahl foundshisproof,voluntary
subjection to authoritarianpower in firmsdoes not violate the legitimate
entitlements
of employees.Whileadult residentsof territorial
associationsdo
possess a moral rightto politicalequality,politiesand firmsare qualitatively
different
ofsubjectsare distinct.
typesofassociationsin whichtheentitlements
Subjectiontopoweris acquiredin different
waysin thetwokindsofassociations,
and thisdifference
deprivesemployees-butnotresidents-ofa righttodemocratic
voiceas a matterofmoraldesert.

Throughouthis career,RobertDahl has been troubledby the
different
ways in whichthosewho governpolitiesand firmsare
chosen in modernsociety.While democracyis the normin the
state,at leastin theadvancedindustrialnations,authoritarianism
prevailsin theeconomy.Mostemployeesaresubjecttomanagers
theydid notelectand to rulesin whichtheyhad littleor no say.
a rolemanifestly
at odds withtheideal of
Theyare subordinates,
the democraticcitizen.Given the "contradictions
between our
commitment
to thedemocraticideal and thetheoryand practice
in our dailylives,"'Dahl has expressedinterest
ofhierarchy
from
inreestablishing
hisearliestpublications
between
symmetry
polity
and economythroughthe democratictransformation
of work.
advocatesofworkplace
TodayDahl is one ofthemostprominent
in
devoted
a book and numerous
America,
democracy
having
articlesand chaptersto thesubjectoverthepast six decades.2
1.RobertDahl,"LiberalDemocracy
intheUnitedStates,"inAProspect
ofLiberal
ed. WilliamLivingston
ofTexasPress,1979),p. 68.
(Austin:University
Democracy,
2. For Dahl's earlyinterestin economicdemocracysee "On theTheoryof
DemocraticSocialism,"PlanAge6 (1940):325-56;"Workers'ControlofIndustry
and theBritishLaborParty,"
American
PoliticalScienceReview41 (1947):875-900;
and RobertDahl and CharlesLindblom,
andWelfare
Politics,
Economics,
(New York:
normativewritingson
Harperand Row,1953),pp. 473-83.His mostimportant
theRevolution?:
ina GoodSociety(New
workplacedemocracyareAfter
Authority
Haven: Yale University
Press,1970),pp. 115-40;"Power to theWorkers?"New
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But although a consistent advocate of the democratic
reorganizationof work,Dahl's strategyof justificationforthis
alternativehas evolved duringthecourseofhis career.Untilthe
middle 1970s, Dahl framed the argument for workplace
democracyin termsof its relativedesirabilityby contrastwith
forinstance,Dahl
theRevolution?,
firm.In After
theauthoritarian
"themostdesirablesystemofauthority"
was concernedtoidentify
in different
kinds of associationsaccordingto the abilityof a
to optimizethevalues ofpersonalchoice,competence
structure
and economy.He argued thaton thisstandardthe "Corporate
Leviathan"is "ludicrouslyfarfromoptimal,"giventhatitviolates
seems
ofpersonalchoice,and that"self-management
thecriterion
socialismor interest
to me closerto theoptimalthanbureaucratic
groupmanagement."3
As Dahl began to develop a theoryofproceduraldemocracy
in the later 1970s,however,a new methodof justificationfor
workplacedemocracyemergedalongside his earlierapproach.
and otherwritings,Dahl now
In A Preface
toEconomic
Democracy
claimed thatthe self-managedfirmis not merelydesirableby
contrast with the alternatives but is also a moral right of
employees. According to this argument,labor is entitled to
democraticvoice in the firmas a matterof right,as a kind of
compensationforsubjectionto therules.In thisway Dahl shifted
the debate about workplacedemocracyfromthe questionof its
consequencesto thequestionofwhatjusticedemands.Ifpower
at workis a moralrightofemployees,thenit is theentitlements
of the individual that matter and not merely the relative
desirabilityof this set of arrangements.Moral rightsmust be
YorkReviewof Books15 (19 November 1970): 20-24; "Governing the Giant
in Corporate
Powerin America,
ed. Ralph Nader and MarkGreen
Corporation,"
(New York:Grossman Publishers,1973), pp. 10-24; "On RemovingCertain
92
Impedimentsto Democracyin theUnitedStates,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly
vs. Control(New Haven:
(1977) 1-20;DilemmasofPluralistDemocracy:
Autonomy
Is
YaleUniversity
Press,1982),pp. 126-33,197-205;
"Democracyin theWorkplace:
ita Rightora Privilege?"Dissent31 (1984):54-60;A Preface
toEconomic
Democracy
ofCalifornia
Press,1985);"Sketchesfora Democratic
Utopia,"
Unversity
(Berkeley:
and Its Critics(New
PoliticalStudies10 (1987): 195-206;Democracy
Scandinavian
Haven: Yale UniversityPress,1989),pp. 325-32;and "Economics,Politics,and
in Toward
A Journey
Institute
ofGovernmental
Democracy:
(Berkeley:
Democracy,"
StudiesPress,1997),pp. 547-51.
theRevolution?,
3. Dahl, After
pp. 56,140.
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respectedeven iftheydo notbenefitothers,and thismeans that
ifDahl's laterargumentis correct,thentheconsequentialistone
is ofonlysecondaryimportance.
Dahl's moral-rights
argument,however,is not persuasive.
Democraticvoice in thefirmis not a rightto which employees
are morallyentitled,or so I hope to show.In thefollowingpages
I critically
examineDahl's prooffortheexistenceofa moralright
that
I also reviewthecounterarguments
toworkplacedemocracy.
have been advanced thus far,which sufferfromtheir own
weaknesses. I show thataccordingto the normof distributive
justice Dahl himself accepts, voluntary subjection to
authoritarian
power in the firmdoes not violate the legitimate
entitlements of employees. This is not true in political
associations, for subjects of a polity are indeed entitled to
democraticvoice as a matterof right,if we accept thatequals
must be treatedequally. Against Dahl, however,I insist that
typesofassociations
politiesand firmsarequalitativelydifferent
of subjectsare distinct.Subjectionto
in which the entitlements
power is acquired in differentways in the two kinds of
associations,and this difference
deprives employees-but not
residents-of a moralclaim to democraticvoice.
While seeking to refuteDahl's moral-rightsproof for
workplace democracy,it is not my intentionto contest his
I am infactsympathetic
toarguments
argumentaboutitsbenefits.
ofworkplacedemocracy,
aboutthedesirability
althoughI am also
of
workwould be
democratization
skepticalthatthewholesale
as unambiguouslybeneficialas Dahl and otheradvocatesclaim.4
is theproper
The point,however,is thatI agreethatdesirability
groundupon whichtheissue shouldbe decided.If thedemos is
4. For examplesofconsequentialist
forworkplacedemocracy
justifications
see HerbertCroly,Progressive
(New York:Macmillan,1914),chap. 18;
Democracy
and Democratic
Carole Pateman,Participation
Theory(Cambridge:Cambridge
ThePolitical
Press,1970);EdwardGreenberg,
Workplace
Effects
Democracy:
University
Press,1986);David Schweickart,
(Ithaca:CornellUniversity
ofParticipation
Against
Press,1993);Samuel Bowles and
Capitalism
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
in
HerbertGintis,"A Politicaland EconomicCase fortheDemocraticEnterprise,"
The Idea of Democracy,ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and JohnRoemer
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp. 375-99;and Christopher
A General
andDemocracy:
andManagement
McMahon,Authority
Theory
ofGovernment
Princeton
Press,
1994).
(Princeton:
University
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persuaded thatdemocratizingwork is clearlyadvantageous,it
shouldbe entitledtomandatethatreform
becauseno moralrights
ifthedemos is notconvincedabout the
are at stake.Conversely,
benefitsofpoliticalequalityat work,itshould notbe compelled
to make the changein thename of protecting
an alleged moral
unlikethepolity,
thequestionofhowpower
right.Withinthefirm,
should be distributedcannotbe resolvedby appeal to themoral
and shouldbe
rightsoftheindividual.Itis a matterofdiscretion,
calculationoftherelativebenefits.
decided by a consequentialist
On the question of democratizingwork,I believe, democratic
deliberationshould notbe trumpedby inflatedrights-claims.

Dahi's Proof
Dahl's prooffortheexistenceof a moralrightto workplace
democracyformsone part of his generaltheoryof procedural
democracy.Althoughfirststatedin severalessays publishedin
the late 1970s,5 it receivedits fullestexpositionin A Prefaceto
In thissectionI explainDahl's proofas set
Economic
Democracy.
forthin thatwork.
A Prefaceto EconomicDemocracy
makes both a moral-rights
and a consequentialist
argumentforworkplacedemocracy.Ifwe
disentanglethe two,Dahl's proofforthe existenceof the right
consistsofthreesteps.The firstspecifiestheconditionsthatmust
existin an associationin orderto validatetheclaim to an equal
share of power.The second step demonstratesthatall of these
conditions apply to economic associations. The third step
addresses the objection that the moral right to workplace
democracyviolatesanotherallegedmoralright,thatofownersto
managetheirpropertyas theysee fit.
5. "On RemovingCertainImpedimentsto Democracy,"pp. 10-12;and
"ProceduralDemocracy,"in Philosophy,
Politicsand Society,
fifth
series,ed. Peter
Laslettand JamesFishkin(New Haven: YaleUniversity
Press,1979),pp. 97-133.
Forcriticism
ofDahl's theoryofproceduraldemocracyand hisrepliessee Phillip
Greenand RobertDahl, "WhatIs PoliticalEquality?:A Controversy,"
Dissent26
(1979): 351-68;RichardKrouse,"Capitalism,Socialism,and PoliticalEquality,"
Dissent27 (1980):453-56;RobertDahl, "A Replyto RichardKrouse,"Dissent27
(1980): 456-58; and Augustus DiZerega, "Equality, Self-Governmentand
PoliticalQuarterly
41
Democracy:A CritiqueofDahl's PoliticalEquality,"Western
(1988):447-68.
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Among advocates of workplace democracy,two different
strategieshave been employedin orderto provethatdemocratic
voice is a moral rightof labor: some theoristsmake autonomy
arguments,while othersappeal to a principleof distributive
justice.The argumentfromautonomyclaimsthatvoiceinthefirm
ofthemoralrightto autonomyall individuals
is an instantiation
Distributive
justicearguments,
by contrast,attemptto
possess.6
show thatan equal shareofpowerin thefirmis an entitlement
of
all who are subjectto itsrules.7In thefirststepofhis proof,Dahl
develops an argumentofthelattersort.8
Dahl's distributive
justiceproofis a variationofan argument
firstset forthby Carl Cohen thirty
yearsago. In a chapteron the
of
Cohen
observed
thatthe rightto an
justification democracy,
in
an
can
share
of
association
be
deduced fromtwo
power
equal
that
should
be
treatedequally;and second,
premises:"first, equals
thatall membersof thatcommunityare equal in the respect(s)
properlyrelevantto the allocationof the rightto participatein
Thefirst
premiseis widelyacceptedbutthesecond
government."'
be
that
members
equal withregardtostakeand standing
requires
intheassociationin ordertodeserveequal voiceinitsgovernance.
If both conditions hold, then democraticpower is owed to
membersas a matterofdistributive
justice.
Dahl's listof thecriteriaentitlingone to democraticvoice in
an associationis essentiallya moreelaboratevariationofCohen's
argument.In its firstversion,Dahl listedonly two criteriathat
mustexistin orderto claimtheright:first,that"thereis a need
forcollectivedecisionsthatare bindingon the membersof the
association";and second,thatthe"membersare roughlyequally
qualified,taken all around."" Later versionsof the argument
6. For examplesof theautonomyargumentsee PatriciaWerhane,Persons,
andCorporations
1985),pp. 133-35;Carol
Rights,
(EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,
Gould,Rethinking
Press,1988),pp.
Democracy
(Cambidge:CambridgeUniversity
ThePhilosophical
Foundations
84-85,143; and JamesHyland, Democratic
Theory:
Press,1995),pp. 231-33.
(Manchester:ManchesterUniversity
7. For an exampleof thedistributive
justiceargumentsee MichaelWalzer,
A Defense
andEquality
(New York:BasicBooks,1983),
Spheres
ofJustice:
ofPluralism
see RobertMayer,"MichaelWalzer,
pp. 291-303.Fora critiqueofWalzer'sargument
IndustrialDemocracy,
and ComplexEquality,"PoliticalTheory
29 (2001):237-61.
8. Dahl,Preface
toEconomic
Democracy,
p. 85.
9. Carl Cohen,Democracy
ofGeorgiaPress,1971),p. 244.
(Athens:University
10. Dahl, "On RemovingCertainImpediments
toDemocracy,"
pp. 10-12.
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extendedthe listof criteriato seven,fourof whichconcernthe
natureoftheassociationand threethememberswho composeit.
toEconomic
As Dahl putsitinA Preface
"thevalidityof
Democracy,
a claimtothisrightrestson certainassumptionsaboutthenature
of a democratic association and the people in it.""' The
assumptionsare (1) thatthe association'srules are "bindingon
all membersof the collectivity";
(2) thatthereis a deliberative
before
rules
are
process
adopted; (3) that "binding collective
decisionsoughtto be made onlyby personswho-aresubjectto
decisions";(4) that"thegood ofeach personis entitledto equal
consideration";(5) that"each adult personin the associationis
entitledto be thefinaljudge ofhis or herown interests";(6) that
"all the adult membersof the association...areroughlyequally
do ordo notrequirebinding
wellqualifiedtodecidewhichmatters
collectivedecisions";and (7) that"when the claims of different
personsto a scarceand valued thingare equally valid, and no
person'sclaimis betterorworsethananyother's,thenifthething
is appropriately
divisibleintoequal shares(as, forexample,votes
can be divided),each equally qualifiedclaimantis entitledto an
equal share."12
A moment'sreflection
revealsthattheseventhitemon Dahl's
listcorrespondsto Cohen's firstpremise(thatequals should be
treatedequally),while the othersix specifythe kinds of equal
stakeand standingthatunderwritea democraticdistribution
of
power (Cohen's second premise).Dahl's argumentis thatthe
sevenitemsarean exhaustivelistoftheconditionsnecessaryand
sufficient
to sustain a claim to an equal share of power in an
association.The proofis conditional,takingan if-thenform,but
Dahl insiststhat"in any associationforwhichthe assumptions
are valid, the memberspossess an inalienablerightto govern
themselvesby means of thedemocraticprocess,whetheror not
theychoose to exercisethatright."13
Given the number of assumptions upon which the
conclusionrests,it is easy to miss the underlyingforceof this
proof.Its gist,however,can be simplystated:if equals should
be treatedequally,and membersof a groupare indeed equal in
11.Dahl, Preface
toEconomic
Democracy,
p. 57.
12. Ibid.,pp. 57-58.
13. Ibid.,p. 61.
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all relevantrespects,theneach is entitledas a matterof rightto
an equal share of power in the association. Like a geometric
proof,the conclusion followslogicallyfromthe premises.As
Cohen notes,if these conditionshold foran association,then
"we have no rationalway to justifyany preference
being given
to some overothers;upon himwho would give such preference
lies theobligationto justifysuch preference."14
conditionsfor
Having specifiedthenecessaryand sufficient
to democraticvoice, the second step in Dahl's
the entitlement
argumentis toshow thatall sevenassumptionshold foreconomic
associations.Dahl takesit forgrantedthattheseven do hold for
political associations,which means thatresidentsof a polity
possess a moralrightto politicalequality.WhatDahl mustnow
proveis thatemployeesare themoralequivalentof residents,a
step RichardArnesondubs "the parallel case argument.""By
analogy,Dahl claimsthatthecitizenis to a polityas theemployee
is to a firm.Hence, "ifdemocracyis justifiedin governingthe
state, then it must also be justified in governing economic
and tosay thatitis notjustified
ingoverning
economic
enterprises;
in
is
to
it
is
not
that
the
justified governing state.""6
enterprises imply
Of theseven itemsenumeratedin thefirststep,Dahl argues
thatonlytwo are open to seriouschallengeas inapplicablein the
firm:conditionsone and six. The firstassumptionholds thatfor
ofmembers,theymustbe subject
democracytobe an entitlement
to bindingdecisionsby theassociation.Afterall, ifthedecisions
will notbe enforcedin anyway,itdoes notreallymatterwhether
I have a say in themor not.Dahl notesthatsome may question
theparallelcase herebecause a firm'srulesarenotbindingin the
same way as thelaws of a polity."Unlikecitizensof a state,one
might object, workers are not compelledto obey managerial
The stateclaims
decisions;theirdecisionto do so is voluntary."17
a monopoly over the legitimatemeans of violence within a
and uses thatcoercivepowertoenforceitslaws,whereas
territory
thefirmdoes not.A businesscan onlyfireme ifI breakitsrules,
14.Cohen,Democracy,
p. 245.
15.RichardAmeson,"DemocraticRightsatNationaland WorkplaceLevels,"
in Copp, IdeaofDemocracy,
p. 138.
16. Dahl,Preface
toEconomic
Democracy,
p. 111.
17. Ibid.,p. 114.
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but the statecan throwme in jail or even take my life,and this
differencemightsuggest that the decisions of an economic
association are not sufficientlybinding to justifya rightto
democraticvoice in theirformulation.
Dahl counters,however,thatthisdistinctionis not relevant
to the assumptionin question.Decisions of an associationare
binding even if not coercively enforced as long as "severe
sanctions"are imposed fornoncompliance.The factthata firm
can fireme fordisobedience,thusdeprivingme temporarily
ofa
livelihood,is a seriousenoughsanctionto rendermydecisionto
Termination
ofmembershipis an
obey less thanfullyvoluntary.
exerciseofpower,and Dahl's pointis thatwhenpoweris exercised
by associationsover subjects,and themembersare equals, then
each has a rightto an equal say in how thatpower is exercised.
"Like a state,then,a firmcan also be viewed as a politicalsystem
in whichrelationsofpower existbetweengovernments
and the
governed.Ifso, is itnotappropriateto insistthattherelationship
betweengovernorsand governedshould satisfythe criteriaof
the democraticprocess-as we properlyinsistin the domain of
thestate?""8
The sixthconditionof the entitlement
argumentholds that
themembersmustbe equallyqualifiedto makejudgmentsabout
how the associationshould be run.In manyrespectsthisis the
decisivepremiseof theargumentfordemocracy,
forifsome are
better
able
to
discern
the
common
manifestly
good thanothers,it
is not clear why the restwould be entitledto an equal shareof
power in theassociation.This seems to have been one ofPlato's
forinstance.Dahl recognizesthata modobjectionstodemocracy,
Plato mightcontesttheparallelcase
ern-day,corporate-capitalist
on preciselythisscore,arguingthatstockholders
and themanagers theyappointare betterqualifiedto make businessdecisions
forthelong-term
good ofthefirmthanrank-and-file
employees."9
Dahl repliesto thisobjectionby appealingto theconclusions
of empiricaland theoretical
economics.He notesthataccording
to rational-choice
labor
shouldcareat leastas muchabout
theory,
thelong-term
the
of
business
as ownersor managerssince
good
labor's exitoptionsare usuallymoreconstrained:
18. Ibid.,p. 115.
19. Ibid.,pp. 116-17.
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from
thelossesincurred
thedecline
ofa firm
arenormally
byworkers
evengreater
thanthoseinvestors
foritisordinarily
mucheasier
suffer;
inhumanterms
in
andlesscostly
fora well-heeled
investor
toswitch
toswitch
inandout
andoutofthesecurities
market
thanfora worker
A moderately
wouldtherefore
ofthelabormarket.
worker
foresightful
concerned
withlong-run
efficiencies
as a rational
investor
beas greatly
andperhaps
ora rational
moreso.20
manager,
Thistheoretical
predictionis confirmed
by theactualbehaviorof
worker-managed
cooperatives.Dahl citesa numberofempirical
firmsdo makerationaleconomic
studiesthatconcludedemocratic
decisionsand are capable ofsavingand investingforthesake of
long-termperformance.21Thus, the strongprincipleof equality
does seemtobe a plausibleassumption.Whatis more,ifthecritics
are rightthatemployeesare notqualifiedto manage theirfirms,
thenitsurelyfollowsthatcitizensareevenless qualifiedtogovern
thestate,giventhatemployeesalmostalways knowmoreabout
thebusinessforwhichtheyworkthancitizensdo about public
affairs.Most opponentsofworkplacedemocracyare notwilling
togo thatfar,however,foritwould costthemthevotetheycherish
in thestate.In theend Dahl remindshis readersthat"thestrong
principleof equality does not requirethatcitizensbe equally
to believethatcitizens
competentin everyrespect.It is sufficient
arequalifiedenoughtodecidewhichmattersdo ordo notrequire
bindingcollectivedecisions...and on matterstheydo not feel
to decideforthemselves,
[that]theyarequalifiedto set
competent
thetermson whichtheywill delegatethesedecisionsto others."22
Having refutedthese objections,Dahl maintainsthat the
analogy between firmand polity holds, and that all seven
the entitlement
to democraticvoice
assumptionsunderwriting
in
full
to
economic
The
last step in the
associations.
apply
is
to
show
that
the
moral
to
argument
right workplacedemocracy
is not trumpedby theclaimsof a superiormoralright.The one
candidatethatmightplay thisroleis therightto property,
which
some allege would be violatedif labor gains equal voice in the
managementofthefirm.In a democratic
workplaceownerscould
20. Ibid.,p. 123.
21. Ibid.,pp. 122-33.Forfurther
evidenceon theperformance
ofcooperative
see Schweickart,
enterprise
AgainstCapitalism,
pp. 88-136.
22. Ibid.,p. 118.
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no longer boss employees around; indeed, it seems that
employeeswould now be in a positionto boss around owners
and their physical assets, thus infringingon the rightful
entailmentsofproperty.
Dahl denies,however,thattherightto propertyis in facta
moralrightat all.23Whilegrantingthatindividualsdo possess a
moralrightto economicliberty,
he rejectstheclaimthattheright
to propertyis a directinstantiationof that moral right.The
derivationoftherighttoproperty
fromtherighttoliberty
involves
a seriesof non sequiturs,and thissuggeststhatownershipis a
conventional right subject to democratic deliberation and
Ifin theircurrentformpropertyrightsconflictwith
redefinition.
therighttoworkplacedemocracy,
theymustgiveway in orderto
In economicassociations
ofmoralrights.
preservetheinviolability
itis democracythatis trumps,
nottheownershipofassets,because
power overpeople is morallynon-negotiable.
WiththisargumentDahl claimsthatthemoralrightoflabor
to self-government
has been sustained.The denial ofdemocratic
an injustice,a
voice to employeesin theworkplaceis therefore
violationoftheinalienablerightsoftheindividual.The factthat
itis sanctionedtodayby majorityruleand majorityopinionis no
formoralrightscannotlegitimately
be suspended
justification,
show
of
hands.
Dahl
devotes
first
a
the
Though
chapterof A
by
to
Economic
a
to
refutation
of
Democracy
Preface
Tocqueville'sclaim
thatdemocraciesaregiventomajority
theremainderof
tyranny,24
thebook seemsto provethatthetyranny
ofthemajorityis in fact
pervasive where economic rightsare concerned.Democratic
ofwhomarealso employeesofauthoritarian
citizens,themajority
firms,forsome reason refuseto enforcethe moral rightthey
possess as individualsto politicalequalityat work.

Flawed Refutations
Despite Dahl's statureas thepremierdemocratictheoristin
the postwarera, surprisinglylittleattentionhas been devoted
to his prooffortheexistenceof a moralrightto workplacede23. Ibid.,pp. 73-83.
24. Ibid.,pp. 7-51.
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Wed, 13 May 2015 17:54:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

RIGHTTO WORKPLACEDEMOCRACY

231

mocracy.Most ofthereviewsofA PrefacetoEconomicDemocracy
passed over the issue in silence.Nonetheless,ifone scours the
literature
one can findtwo different
groundsupon whichDahl's
argumenthas been challenged,but in myview neitherof these
refutationssucceeds.
One objectionis directedagainstthethirdstepinDahl's proof,
on therelativeinferiority
ofproperty
JanNarveson,a noted
rights.
libertarian
insists
thatthereis a moral
Dahl
philosopher,
against
does
to
and
that
it
right privateproperty
trumptheputativeright
todemocraticvoiceatwork.2One would expectnothingless from
a libertarian.The issues hereare thorny,
but fortunately
we can
of
ourselves
the
trouble
the
thicket
of
entering
spare
property
rights
in which both Dahl and Narveson become entangled if we
recognizeat theoutsetthatownershipofphysicalassetsby itself
never entailspower to directthe labor of others,which is the
McMahon observes,
questionat hand. As Christopher
Central to ownership is the rightto exclude othersfromcontactwith
an item.Ownershipthusgives theowner of an itemthe rightto control
the uses to which othersput it in thesense thathe may veto any use of
it proposed by someone else. But it does not give him any rightto tell
anyone to put thatpropertyto theuse thathe wants. It is not a rightto
command labor.26

moral license to confer
Ownershipby itselfis not a sufficient
on
Hence
the
fact
that
authority managers.
employersown all of
the physicalassets of a business does not entitlethemto boss
labor around. Conversely,a democraticreorganizationof the
enterprisewould not conferpower on labor to use another's
withouttheowner'sconsent.Forthisreasondemocratic
property
and
rights
propertyrightsare capable of peacefulcoexistence,
withouttheneed to establisha hierarchy
betweenthem,sincethe
oneis concernedwithpoweroverpeopleand theotherwithpower
over things.In an economicdemocracyownerscould keep their
property and workers would retain their voice, and their
in themarketplacewould be governedby contract.
interactions
Insteadofcapitalhiringlabor,in a democraticeconomylaborwill
25. JanNarveson,"Democracyand EconomicRights,"SocialPhilosophy
and
Policy9 (1992):45-49.
26. McMahon,Authority
andDemocracy,
p. 15.
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fromowners,but ownersmight
hirecapital,leasingitat interest
remainfreeto keep theirpropertyiftheydo notwish to put it to
use.27
productive

It is important
to recognize,then,thatthedemocratization
of
workneed not entailtheexpropriation
of any physicalassets of
owners.Dahl, certainly,
cannotbe portrayedas a bloodthirsty
communistbent on expropriatingthe expropriators.What he
wantsto takefromcapitalis nottherightto controlpropertybut
thepower to commandlabor.To be sure,loss ofthispower does
butthevictimofthis"takings"is
involvea kindofexpropriation,
notcapitalbutlaboritself.Whendemocracyatworkis mandated,
labor loses the rightto sell voice in exchangefora job. Capital
therebyloses therightto buy voice,but it is fromlaborthatthis
asset is actuallytaken.Ifwe thinkofvoice as personalproperty,
thenit is truethatworkplacedemocracyconflicts
withproperty
but
the
is
conflict quitedifferent
fromtheone aboutwhich
rights,
Dahl and Narvesondisagree.
As a libertarian,Narveson is still likely to object to the
oflabor'srighttosellvoicetocapital,butthenagain
expropriation
some libertariansalso complain about preventinglabor from
is
To a libertarian
sellingitselfintoslavery28
virtuallyeverything
while
inalienable
are
an
property,
rights usuallyjust illegitimate
restraint
on freetrade.For therestofus, however,theloss ofthe
as a marketable
assetmightseem
righttotreatourpersonalliberty
likea gain,and thesame could be said fortheloss oftherightto
sell voice. At theveryleast it is importantto recognizethatthe
real conflictbetweenpropertyrightsand democraticrightsis
different
fromtheone Dahl and Narvesondebate,and thatstep
three in Dahl's proof is either unnecessary or must be
reformulated.
Denyingmoralstatustoproperty
rightsis lesslikely
to be convincingoncewe learnthatthe"property"in questionis
voice and notmerelyphysicalassets.
The secondobjectionto thevalidityofDahl's proofis leveled
againstthefirststep,whichsets forththecriterianecessaryand
27. On laborhiringcapitalin economicdemocracysee David Ellerman,The
Democratic
Worker-Owned
Firm(Boston:UnwinHyman,1990),p. 64.
28. On thelibertarian
forself-enslavement
see RobertNozick,
justification
State,andUtopia(New York:BasicBooks,1974),p. 331;and J.Philmore,
Anarchy,
"The Libertarian
Case forSlavery,"ThePhilosophical
Forum14 (1982):43-58.
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to claim an equal share of power in an association.
sufficient
Richard Arneson.argues in effectthat if we specifythe first
condition in Dahl's list more carefully,the parallel case fails
because that condition is not usually met by economic
associations.The conditionin questionconcernstheexistenceof
binding decisions, an assumptionDahl recognized mightbe
contestedby opponents. Arneson points to "the differential
voluntarinessof the individual'srelationshipto politicsand to
work," which he insists"stronglyconditionsthe forceof the
individual's claim to a democraticsay in each area." If one's
subjectionto power is voluntary,he argues, then thereis no
entitlement to democratic voice. Arneson measures the
voluntarinessof subjection,however,by the existenceof exit
optionsin theformofothereconomicor politicalassociationsto
whichone could feasiblymove.Theclaimis that"thepresenceof
exitoptionscan weaken theparallelcase argument."
significant
If I could go elsewherebut decide to stay,thenmysubjectionto
authoritarian
power in an associationis voluntary.Hence I am
notentitledto politicalequalityin itsinceI voluntarily
submitto
that
Arneson's
conclusion
is
powerlessness.
"havingoptionsand
democratic
forone another."29
be
substitutes
rightsmay
enjoying
In a marketeconomylaborusuallyhas multipleemployment
Thisis especiallytruein thelabor-scarce
opportunities.
economy
of thepast year,but it also holds in leanertimes.It remainstrue
evenin theacademicjob market,
despitetheglutoflabor.Though
tenuremakesmanya professorfeellikea serf,attachedforlifeto
theinstitution
thatgrantedit,thefactis thatacademicshave other
feasibleemploymentopportunitiesof which theycould avail
themselves.I could quitmyjob tomorrowand becomean adjunct
instructor
at threeor fourcommunity
colleges,or tryto geta job
or
into
business
as a freelancewriter,
or
school,
teachinghigh
go
I
so
at
and
on.
do
not
do
so
because
current
McDonald's,
apply
my
job seems thebest of the available options,but the existenceof
alternativescannotbe denied.This is Arneson'spoint:ifI have
options but nonethelesschoose to stay put, my submissionto
powerlessnessis voluntaryand I cannottherefore
complainthat
an injusticehas been done to me. ThoughI mightlikemycurrent
job plus democraticvoice to boot,I have notbeen wrongedifno
"Democratic
29.Arneson,
Levels,"pp.138-43.
RightsatNationalandWorkplace
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Wed, 13 May 2015 17:54:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

234

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

employeroffersit to me, any morethan I have been wronged
incomefor
because no employeris willingto pay me a six-figure
ifI had no
theskillsI have to offer.
The case would be different
realisticoptionsand so was forcedto obey authoritarian
power
forwant of an alternative.Then voice would be my rightsince
Arnesonnotes
subjectionis no longerunambiguouslyvoluntary.
thatthisis usually the situationof citizensin the nation-state,
whereexitfromtheassociationis muchmorecostlythanin the
labormarket.It is forthisreasonthatcitizensbut notemployees
voice:"Therighttoa democratic
areusuallyentitledtodemocratic
in
is
the
domain
of
politics meant to ensure that those
say
avoid will be tolerableoverall and in
one
cannot
consequences
thelong run.""30
we should notethatArnesondoes not
Despite thiscriticism
Dahl's
so muchrefute
it; in essence
parallelcase as reformulate
he rewritesthe firstassumptionin such a way thatit can still
than
hold good in bothpolityand firm,thoughless frequently
Dahl claims. Accordingto Arneson'srevised version,the first
assumptionnow statesthattherulesarebindingiftheexitoptions
As Arnesonhimselfadmits,
ofmembersare sharplyconstrained.
thiscould conceivablybe truein thelabormarket,forexamplein
an isolatedone-company
Becauseexitis costlyinthiscase,
town.31
laborwould have a valid claimto a democraticshareofpowerin
the firm.Conversely,the assumptionmightnot be met in an
exitoptionsexist.Arnesongives
authoritarian
polityifsignificant
theexampleoftwoneighboring
countrieswitha commonculture
fromwhichexitis easy:"Ifone land is an autocracyand theother
is a democracy,the factthatcitizensin the autocracyhave the
low-cost option of moving to the democratic sister nation
lessenstheargumentthatcitizensofbothlandshave
substantially
democratic citizenship rights that the autocratic order
systematicallyviolates."32And that example is not purely
itholds forthegreatmajorityoflocal governments
hypothetical:
in America,fromwhichexitis ofteneasierthanfromone's job. If
Arnesonis right,mostresidentsof local politiesdo not have a
moral rightto democraticvoice since theycan always move if
theydo notlikethelocal dictatorship.
30. Ibid.,p. 140.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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But this surprisingconclusion should suggest to us that
of the parallel
somethingis wrongwithArneson'srestatement
case. My intuitionstellme thatI am entitledto democraticvoice
in local governmenteven ifmyexitoptionsare great.33
The fact
thatI could easily move someplace else does not seem relevant
to the entitlement,
formunicipalitiesas much as nation-states
enforcerulesagainstme.Whatis more,Dahl himselfobjectsthat
the exit argument "exaggerates the differencesbetween a
worker'ssubjectionto decisionsmade by the governmentof a
firmand a citizen'ssubjectionto decisionsmade by thegovernmentof the state." Withregardto both types of associations,
Dahl asks, "is not 'exit' (or exile) oftenso costly,in everysense,
that membershipis for all practical purposes compulsory?"
Arnesonrestshis case on the existenceof formalexit options,
but Dahl points out thatsubstantivelythese options are often
hollow. He concludes that"because exit is so costly,membership in a firmis not significantlymore voluntary or less
compulsorythancitizenshipin a municipalityor perhapseven
in a country,"34and I am willingto concede the point to him.
AlthoughI do believe thatArnesonis on the righttrackwhen
he claims thatthebindingnessof rulesis relevantto the distributionofpowerwithinassociations,he errsinjudgingtheextent
ofbindingnessby theexitoptionsofmembers.
The bindingness of rules, however,can be measured in
another way. Ease of exit is one dimension, but a second
overlookedby Dahl and Arnesonalike concernsentranceinto
the association-for rules are bindingnot only if one lacks an
exitoptionbut also ifone lackstheoptionnottobe subjectto the
associationin thefirstplace. In otherwords,themannerinwhich
subjectionto rules is acquired conditionsone's entitlementto
voice in an association,and it is thiscircumstanceratherthan
the presenceof an exitoptionthatundercutsthe parallel case.
Subjectionis acquired in different
ways in firmsand polities,I
will show in the following sections, and this difference
invalidates the entitlementto political equality in firmsas a
matterof distributive
justice.
33.Thereasoning
thatunderlies
thisintuition
willbe setforth
inthenextsection.
34. Dahl, Preface
toEconomic
114-16.
Democracy,
pp.
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AcquiringSubjection

Generallyspeaking,subjectionto therulesof an association
canbe acquiredinone oftwoways:eitherthesubjectionis optional
case we say thatindividualspossess
oritis required.In theformer
a "subjectionoption,"whichmeans thatrefusalto submitto the
associationleaves one freefromsubjectionto its rules. Where
subjectionis optionalone mustjointheassociationbeforeitsrules
becomebinding.In associationsin whichsubjectionis required,
by contrast,a subjectionoptionis lacking.Here membersdo not
join in ordertobecomesubjectto therulesbutareconscriptedby
the association.Subjectionis imposed regardlessof choicesuch
thatmembersare notmerelysubjectsbutare also subjected.
They
sufferan impositioninitiatedby theassociation.3"
Now it is my claim thatthepresenceof an exitoptiondoes
to voice in an associationbut the
notconditionone's entitlement
Thefirst
of
a
does.
option
assumptioninDahl's
presence subjection
read
on
the
of
should
therefore
list,
bindingness rules,
seven-point
thata subjectionoptionis lacking.Wheresubjectionis required
theproofholds,forifanassociationimposesruleson meregardless
ofchoice,andequals mustbe treatedequally,andwe are equal in
therelevantrespects,thenI have a moralrightto an equal share
arisespreciselyfrom
ofpowerin theassociation.The entitlement
thefactthatothersfirststakeda claimtopowerovermebuthave
no betterclaim to thispower thanI do. Ifpower theremustbe,
and equals mustbe treatedequally,thenan equal share of that
power is my right.Those who initiatedmy subjectionhave no
superiorclaimto thepower,and we are therefore
obligedtoshare
this"commongood" equally.
But if not,thennot. Whereprospectivememberspossess a
subjectionoption theirsubjectionto the rules is not imposed
35. ThroughoutthissectionI avoid the language of "voluntariness"in
thataccorda subjectionoptiontoprospectivemembers.
describingorganizations
In theircriticismsof Dahl's proofboth Narveson and Arnesonemploy this
but theyfailto distinguish
betweenthedifferent
carefully
terminology,
ways in
which organizationscan be voluntary.Freedomto leave is one dimensionof
but freedomnot to be subjectto theorganizationis another.We
voluntariness,
would do bettertoavoid thislanguageentirely
and focuson thekindsofoptions
organizationsaccordto members.Forreasonsthatwillbecomeclearin thenext
section,I also avoid thecontestedlanguageofconsentinbuildingmyargument.
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regardlessofchoice.Theyhave an optionto be a memberor not,
to join iftheassociationwill have them,and thismeans thatthe
rules of the associationdo not bind in thesame way wherethe
optionis lacking.Associationsthatrecognizea subjectionoption
on thepartofprospectivemembersdo notconscriptsubjectsbut
oneelementofwhichmight
volunteers.
recruit
Theymakean offer,
be voicelessnessin the governanceof the association,but the
voicelessness is not imposed without the option to refuse
subjection.The termsofsubjectionare negotiated,and while the
ofvoice maybe unequal,thatdistribution
resultingdistribution
does notviolatetheprincipleofjusticeupon whichDahl's proof
is premised.Thatprincipleis notequal outcomesperse butequal
withinequalitiesofvoice
ofequals,whichis consistent
treatment
in an associationas longas subjectionto therulesis authentically
optional. Presumablyassociations thatmake unequal voice a
conditionofmembershipmustoffersome kindofcompensation
in returnin orderto attractsubjects.36Wherea minimumdegree
ofcompensationis lackingwe have reasonto doubttheexistence
of a subjectionoption (an issue to whichwe will returnin the
nextsection),butwherethatminimumstandardis metan unequal
share of voice is not an injusticeto membersgiven the seventh
assumptionin Dahl's proof.It could onlybe so ifequal outcomes
are mandatedfromthestart,butifthatis theprincipleoffairness
upon whichtherighttoworkplacedemocracyis predicatedthen
theothersix assumptionswould be unnecessary.
Dahl, however,
is not a "simple egalitarian," to employ Michael Walzer's
followsfromDahl's own logicthat
and ittherefore
terminology,"7
ofmemberswherea subjectionoption
voice is notan entitlement
exists.Such membersare not requiredto join or obey the rules,
36.The claimtopoliticalequalityin an organizationcan be a valuableasset.
Capitalistfirmspurchasetheclaim(negotiatepoliticalinequality)because they
thinktheycan maximizeprofits
how theworkwillbe done.Whether
bydictating
in thefirmin factenhancesprofitability
is a
an authoritarian
politicalstructure
ofthisclaim(bymandating
contested
issue.Ifitdoes,thenexpropriation
workplace
democracyineveryfirm)shouldresultin diminshedcompensationforlabor.For
two argumentsalong theselinessee Ian Maitland,"Rightsin theWorkplace:A
NozickianArgument,"Journal
ofBusinessEthics8 (1989): 951-54;and Michael
We
Let
"Should
Phillips,
EmployeesContractawayTheirRightsagainstArbitrary
ofBusinessEthics13 (1994):233-42.
Discharge?"Journal
37. Walzer,Spheres
ofJustice,
p. xii.
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and thismeansthattheunequal voice theyacceptin enteringthe
associationcannotbe construedas an injusticedone to them.
A setofexampleswillillustrate
therelevanceofthisdistinction
forthe entitlement
to equal voice in various associations.Take,
first,the case of polities. Given my specificationof the first
associations
assumptioninDahl's list,adultresidentsofterritorial
do possess a moral rightto political equality.This is because
residentsareessentially
associationsand
conscripted
byterritorial
to
the
rules
of
choice.
The
required obey
regardless
mythof the
social contractnotwithstanding,
polities do not ask residents
whethertheywantto obeybeforesubjectionis imposedwithina
Governments
imposefirstand ask forconsentlater-if
territory.
indeed theyeverdo. The poweris simplyclaimed,but therulers
who claim sovereigntyare no betterthan the adult residents
subjectedtoit.Unlessthepoweris sharedequally,therefore,
equals
will notbe treatedequally.The normofequalitythatgovernsthe
will be violated,and an injusticedone to voiceless
distribution
Political
subjects.
equalityis preciselythe compensationequals
are owed fortheimpositionofsubjection.
But what of immigrants?
Don't prospectivenewcomersto a
territorial
associationpossess a subjectionoptionthatwould rob
themoftheentitlement
tovoiceas a matterofdistributive
justice?
If so, it seems thatpolitiescould legitimately
requireconsentto
voicelessnessas a conditionforadmissionto the territory.
The
resultwould be an unequal systemof membership,in which
nativeresidents
arefull-fledged
citizenswhileimmigrant
residents
are merelysubjects.Thisis thelogicofguest-worker
laws,which
requiresome groupsofnewcomersto tradetheclaimtovoice for
therightofadmissionintotheterritory
governedby thepolity.
The existence of a subjection option for prospective
however,is an illusion-one thatpolitiesall toooften
immigrants,
fosterin orderto exploitvulnerablenewcomers.It is an illusion
because it mistakes entering a jurisdiction for joining an
associationorcommonenterprise.38
do makea choice
Immigrants
to changelocation,butmovingis notthesame as joining.WhenI
38. Considerthefruitful
distinction
drawnby MichaelOakeshottbetween
civiland enterprise
associationsin On HumanConduct
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1975),ch.2. Politiesarenotenterprise
associations,buttheysometimesliketoact
as iftheywere.
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move fromone residenceto anotherin a different
jurisdictionI
am notgivenan optionnottobe subjectedtothatnewjurisdiction,
a subjectionoption.
and itis preciselythischoicethatconstitutes
Whilenation-states
be
entitled
to
block
may
entryof aliens,we
should not confuse permission to enter with bestowal of a
to voice. Once
subjectionoptionthatundercutsthe entitlement
some reasonable probationaryperiod has elapsed, such that
newcomerscanbe recognizedas residentsand notmerelytourists
or transients,immigrants(includingguest-workers)must be
accordedthesameshareofpowerenjoyedbynatives.Equals must
be treatedequally,forwhatmattersin politiesis notthenativity
of one's residencybut the factof subjectionand its imposition
are notgivena choice
regardlessofchoice.Nativesofa territory
or
about
whether
to
be
the
subjected not,and so toappeal
by polity
to theprincipleofchoiceforthissubsetofresidents(immigrants)
is an injustice given the norm of equal treatmentand the
assumptionofequal competence.39
therelevanceofconscription
Anotherexamplethatillustrates
to democraticvoice is
or imposed subjectionto the entitlement
unionizationin theclosed shop.Whenmembershipin a unionis
requiredas a conditionof employmenta subjectionoption is
entitledtoself-government.
lackingand themembersaretherefore
the
the
to
rules,
including paymentofdues,is imposed,
Subjection
and voice is thecompensationowed forthisimposition.The fact
thatone could avoid subjectionby nottakingthejob is irrelevant
to theentitlement,
formembershipin thefirmand in theunion
must be distinguished. In accepting employment I am
automaticallyconscriptedby theunionregardlessofchoice,and
since it initiatesthesubjectionI am entitledto an equal shareof
thepowerin return.This typeoforganizationdoes nothave the
discretionto withholdvoice fromme.
Butothertypesofassociations,even iftheyconsistofequally
competentindividuals,do possess such discretionbecause they
accord a subjectionoptionto prospectivemembers.Considera
classic example: a monasticinstitution.
Monasteries,at least in
theCatholictradition,
arenotdemocratic
organizations.
Superiors
are not chosen by those subjectto the discipline,who in some
39. Fora similarargumentagainstguest-worker
laws see Walzer,Spheres
of
Justice,
pp. 56-61.
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ordersare literallyvoiceless.Most people seem to believe that
thereis nothingintrinsically
unfairabout thisradicallyunequal
distribution
of power and thatinitiatesdo not possess a moral
Butifwe applyDahl's
righttopoliticalequalityintheorganization.
versionoftheseven-pointlistto thiscase we mightbe forcedto
concludeagainstour intuitionsthatsuch a rightdoes exist,even
ifmemberschoose notto claimit.As in thecase ofthefirm,only
assumptionsone and sixmightbe contested.4
Regardingthelatter,
a conservativereadingofCatholictheologymightcast doubton
the strongprincipleof equality,but thereis empiricalevidence
thatlaymencan governreligiousorganizationsperfectly
wellwitnessthe Quakers. And withregardto bindingdecisions,if
ofexitis thestandardbywhichbindingnessis measured
difficulty
thenitseemsplausibletoconcludethattherulesarebindingsince
exit fromthe monasteryis likelyto be more difficult
than exit
Ifso, monasteriesoughtto
froma firm,let alone a municipality.
be democratic,but thatis a conclusionmostof us would reject.
And thereasonwe rejectitis preciselybecause initiatespossess a
to voice.
subjectionoptionthatdeprivesthemof theentitlement
whichtheyknowis governed
Novicesopttojoinan organization
in an authoritarian
fashion,and thatoptiondecisivelyconditions
theirentitlements.
Subjectionis notimposedregardlessofchoice,
and thusvoice is not owed as compensationforthe subjection
thatis acquired.
Thesame logicappliesevenmorestraightforwardly
toprivate
clubs,whereequal competenceis widelyassumed.Clubs do not
have tobe democratic,
evenin a democraticsociety.Foundersare
freeto craftthe governancestructure
theydeem best,and new
membershave no moralrightto requirepoliticalequalitywhere
it does notexistas long as theyhave been accordeda subjection
option.Once membersareadmittedtheymaypressfordemocratic
butno fundamental
rights,
injusticeis done tothemifequal voice
is notgranted.In organizations
ofthissortdistributive
justicedoes
not dictatehowvpower should be divided because subjectionto
therulesis notrequired.

thatthe monastery
40. In the examplewe abstractfromthecircumstance
belongsto a largerorganization(theChurch)thatmaybe entitledto choose the
is autonomous.
superiors.Assumeforthesake ofargumentthatthemonastery
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Having now identifiedthe crucialassumptionupon which
theentitlement
to politicalequalitymustbe premisedin orderto
be valid, we are now in a positionto returnto theparallelcase.
WithDahl I agree thatequal voice is owed to adult residentsof
territorial
associationsas a matterof distributive
justice.But do
have
the
same
entitlement?
Are
employees
theyalso denied a
subjectionoption?

The ExploitationObjection
On thefaceofittheanswerseemseasy: theparallelcase fails
because the typicalemployeedoes possess a subjectionoption.
Unlike residents,employees are not conscripted,and forthis
reasontheylack themoralrightto politicalequalitydespitethe
otherways in whichthetwo typesofassociationsare equivalent.
Only slaves and serfswould have a valid claim to democratic
voice,but thepositionoflaborin a capitalistmarketeconomyis
qualitatively differentbecause labor is not subjected to
managementregardlessofchoice.
The conclusionis drawntoo quickly,however,forthereis a
familiarobjectionthatchallengesthe existenceof a meaningful
subjection option for wage-labor in a capitalist economy.
ofmostworkersand
Accordingto thisview,thepropertylessness
theirdependenceon capitalforemployment
makessubjectionin
Whilethelabor
forthemajority.41
thefirma virtualrequirement
marketcreatestheappearanceofchoice,in thesensethatone may
employersor even go intobusinessfor
apply to manydifferent
oneself,only a relativefew have a realisticoption of avoiding
of
subjectionto some capitalistfirmor other.Giventheintensity
competitionand theadvantagesenjoyedby large-scalecapitalist
41. Theclassiclocusforthisargument
is,ofcourse,Marx'sCapital.Attheend
of thechapteron theworkingday,forinstance,Marxobservesthat"ourworker
fromwhenhe enteredit.
emergesfromtheprocessofproduction
lookingdifferent
In themarket,
as theownerofthecommodity
he stoodfaceto face
'labor-power,'
withotherownersofcommodities,
oneowneragainstanotherowner.Thecontract
tothecapitalist
provedinblackand white,so to
bywhichhe sold hislabor-power
Butwhenthetransaction
was concluded,
speak,thathewas freetodisposeofhimself.
itwas discoveredthathe was no 'freeagent,'thattheperiodoftimeforwhichhe is
freeto sell his labor-power
is theperiodof timeforwhichhe is forcedto sell it"
One,trans.BenFowkes[NewYork:VintageBooks,1977],p. 415).
(Capital:Volume
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enterprise,opportunities for self-employmentare sharply
constrained.As a result,we mightconclude thatwage-laboris
conscriptedby capital,notindividuallybut as a class.
effectively
As G. A. Cohenexplains,"sincethefreedomofeach [proletarian]
is contingenton othersnot exercisingtheirsimilarlycontingent
freedom,we can say thatthereis a greatdeal of unfreedomin
theirsituation.Thougheach is individuallyfreeto leave, [each]
unfreedom."42
sufferswiththerestfrom...collective
Ifempiricallyaccurateas a descriptionoftheplightofwagelabor this objection is valid, for exploited labor does lack a
meaningfulsubjectionoption.A libertarianmightchallengethe
but I will
verypossibilityofexploitationin a capitalistmarket,43
I
that
because
the
the
of
force
agree
objection
acknowledge
of
choice
the
renders
illusory.44
appearance
exploitation
Nonetheless,evenifwe granttheobjectionitdoes notfollowthat
exploitedlaborin a capitalisteconomypossessesa moralrightto
conclusionis requiredby the
workplacedemocracy.A different
the
of
objection.
logic
betweentwodifferent
In ordertosee thiswe mustdistinguish
is
meaningsof the claim thatsubjection required.Accordingto
version(required,),
thefirst
subjectionoccursregardlessofchoice.
is simplyclaimed,such thatsubjectsare effectively
Jurisdiction
Itis myargumentthatsubjectiontopolitiesis required
conscripts.
in thissense. But subjectioncan be requiredin a different
way
if
but
one
options
possesses
substantively
formally
(required2),
the optionsare hollow.In thiscase subjectionis acquiesced to
are such thatsubjectionis theonlyviable
because circumstances
Here exploitationtakestheplace of
alternative.
the
least
bad)
(or
individualssubjecttorulesand decisions.45
coercionin rendering
and
of Proletarian
42. G. A. Cohen,"The Structure
Unfreedom,"
Philosophy
12 (1982):11.
PublicAffairs
andUtopia,
seeNozick,Anarchy,
43.Forthelibertarian
State,
objection
pp. 250-65.
44. On the theoryof exploitationsee David Zimmerman,"CoerciveWage
and PublicAffairs
10 (1982): 121-45;JohnRoemer,A General
Offers,"Philosophy
andClass(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1982);and
ofExploitation
Theory
andPolicy12 (1995):136-58.
SocialPhilosophy
AllenWood,"Exploitation,"
45. Accordingto Marx,expropriation
of thedirectproducersresultsin the
of "groupedmassesofmenwho have nothingto sell but theirlaborformation
silentcompulsion
voluntarily....The
power"and "arecompelledtosellthemselves
of economicrelationssets theseal on the dominationof thecapitalistover the
worker"(Capital,p. 899).
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Now if subjectionto capitalistmanagementon the part of
a moment'sreflection
suggeststhatthe
wage-laboris required2,
in
an equal share
is
not
fact
redress
for
this
imposition
appropriate
of voice in the firmbut ratherthe restoration
of choice thathas
been unjustlyconstrained.If consent to subjection has been
renderedhollow throughthereductionof effective
options,the
properremedyforthisloss is to make consentrobustagain by
totheexploitation
objection,
enhancinglabor'schoices.According
labor loses its options because it is propertyless and thus
compelledto acceptdisadvantageousoffersunder the pressure
of necessity.In orderto preventexploitationworkersabove all
need theirown property,
or at least guaranteedsubsistencesuch
no matter
thattheyneverfeelcompelledto acceptjust any offer,
how bad. The propercureforexploitation,
is
not
then,
workplace
democracy but a generous welfare state, or, more radically,
ofproperty.
redistribution
Indeed, mandatinga rightto workplacedemocracyin this
as JohnRoemerdemonstrates.
situationwillnotend exploitation,
Even ifcapitalis notpermittedto hirelabor,so thatall firmsare
in theMarxiansense
laborcollectives,
exploitation
self-governing
will stilloccuriflaboris propertyless.
Thisis because capitalcan
exploitits advantageouspositionin thecreditmarketto extract
interestpaymentswhen it loans capitalto labor.With
exorbitant
to
the
ofan economy,"it does notmatter
regard
exploitativeness
whethercapitalhireslaboror laborhirescapital."Credit-market
as labor-market
which
capitalismcanbe as exploitative
capitalism,
that
itself
is
not
the
cure
forexploitation.
againsuggests
democracy
This is why Roemer concludes that authoritarianismin the
inmaintaining
workplace"is ofsecond-orthird-order
importance
and
its
injustices."46
capitalism
The pointis this:if circumstances
are such thatprospective
lack
effective
choice
and
are forcedto consent to
employees
in
the
the
firm,
powerlessness
properway to undo thisinjustice
is to enhancechoiceby repairingthebackgroundcircumstances
thatundulyconstrainit.The injusticeis notundoneifwe simply
guaranteeequal outcomesintheformofpoliticalequalitybecause
the negotiationprocess is unfair,forself-government
will not
46. JohnRoemer,FreetoLose:An Introduction
toMarxistEconomic
Philosophy
Press,1988),pp. 90-107.
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Wed, 13 May 2015 17:54:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

244

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

renderlabor any less exploitable.The mostthattheexploitation
objection might justify with regard to outcomes is the
establishmentof some minimumlevel of compensationbelow
becomesinvalid.Thisis thelogic
contract
whichtheemployment
and
maximum-hour
of minimum-wage
laws, which reduce
freedomofcontractin orderto preventexploitationofespecially
If labor consentsto voicelessnessat work
vulnerablegroups.47
thecommunity
due to exploitation,
mightestablisha minimum
degreeofvoiceinthefirmthatcannotbe bargainedaway,perhaps
by abolishingat-willclauses or mandatingunionizationor even
Buttherighttoworkplacedemocracyis notthe
codetermination.
the
of
minimumwage, preciselybecause democratic
equivalent
voice is nottheminimallyacceptablecompensationofvoluntary
laborbutthemaximum.To guaranteeequal voice to all members
ofthefirmis likeguaranteeingeach workerthesame pay as the
CEO. The obligationto preventexploitationdoes not compelus
to go thatfar.Societyneed onlyinsiston a minimumdegreeof
voice below whichno employeemayconsent.The aim shouldbe
to block tyranny(abuse), but full-fledged
democracyis not the
at work.
onlycurefortyranny
Now considertheotherversionoftheexploitationobjection.
Assume fora momentthatsubjectionto capitalistmanagement
on the part of wage-laboris required. Here the robustnessof
consent is irrelevant,for subjects are simply conscripted
regardlessof choice.48But even in thiscase democraticvoice in
thefirmis not an entitlement
of labor,althoughit would be in
themanagementoftheeconomyas a whole. This is because the
"conscription"of labor in a capitalist economy only occurs
not at the level of the firmbut with regardto the
collectively,
In thisrespect(and manyothers)theplight
class in its entirety.
and
of slaves
proletariansdiffers,forslaves are conscripted
individuallyby a specificownerwhile wage-laborersare only
47. On thelogicofminimum-wage
laws as a remedyforexploitation
see Joel
HarmtoSelf(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1986),p. 79;and Thomas
Feinberg,
Hudson, "ImmutableContractRules,the BargainingProcess,and Inalienable
Rights,"ArizonaLawReview34 (1992):343.
48. According to Marx, the "surplus population of workers...formsa
reservearmy,
whichbelongstocapitaljustas absolutelyas if
disposableindustrial
thelatterhad bredit at itsown cost"(Capital,p. 784). In thissense workersare
virtualconscripts,
thecapitalistequivalentoftheTrotskyist
laborarmy
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conscriptedas a class. Slaves are therefore
morallyentitledto
in
firm
the
but
voice-rights
conscriptedwage-laborersonlygain
voice-rightsin the managementof capital as a whole. To claim
thatcapital conscriptslabor is to implythatcapital is a public
theeconomicequivalentofthepolity.Like residents,
institution,
be entitledto an equal say in the
employees would therefore
management of capital, but only capital in the aggregate.
Employeesofanygivencapitalistfirmwould be no moreentitled
in thatfirmthancivil servantsare entitled
to self-government
in theirparticularagency.Dahl's proofdoes
to self-government
nothold forpublicemployeesbecause thethirdconditionin the
seven-pointlistis notmet:thatbindingcollectivedecisionsought
to be made only by persons who are subjectto the decisions.
Police officers,
forexample,are not morallyentitledto choose
if
theirbosses as theywere a self-governing
collectivebecause
law enforcementis a public good, the propertyof the entire
demos. The citizenryas a whole,givenitssubjectstatus,has the
righttochoosethemanagementofthisagency,and policeofficers
only share in that right in their capacity as citizens, not
employees.The same would hold trueiffirmsare nationalized
as a publicgood. Citizensthenacquirethemoralrightto choose
managementbut the employees of each nationalized firmdo
not. Of course,thedemos may decide to establisha democratic
structureof governancein each firm,but that is a matterof
discretionand would depend on a consequentialistcalculation
of the relative benefits of workplace democracy from the
standpointof thecommunityas a whole.
On eitherversionoftheexploitationobjection,then,thecase
fora moralrighttoworkplacedemocracyfails.Ifwe say thatthe
theparallelcase collapsesbecause
subjectionoflaboris required2,
thesubjectionoptionis onlyhollowbutnotabsent.The exploitation thatundercutsthe subjectionoption should certainlybe
theinjustice.Bycontrast,
undone,butvoice perse willnotrectify
ifwe say thatthesubjectionoflaboris required1,
theparallelcase
is sustainedbutemployeesare stillnotmorallyentitledto voicerightsin the firm.The selection of managementin this case
becomestheprivilegeofthedemosand itsrepresentatives,
while
in
firm
the
become
their
servants.
employees
public
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The BenefitsofConsequentialism

I conclude,then,thata moralrightto workplacedemocracy
on groundsof distributive
justicedoes not exist.Employeesare
notlikecitizensbecausepoweris notclaimedoverthemregardless
ofchoice.Forthatreasonemployeescannotclaiman equal share
of power in the firmas a matterof right,because the normof
distributive
justicetowhichDahl subscribesis notviolated.Unlike
residents,employeespossess a subjectionoption,which means
thattheirsubjectionto authoritarian
ruleis a matterofdiscretion.
Until this choice is shown to be invalid or irrelevant,their
subjectioncannotbe describedas an injustice.
It can, nonetheless,be describedas undesirable.In addition
to his moral-rightsproof,Dahl develops a consequentialist
argumentforworkplace democracyin A Prefaceto Economic
That argumenthas much going forit,thoughI do
Democracy.49
thinkhe overstatesthe case."5Whatever its specific defects,
however,Dahl's consequentialist
argumentdoes have thevirtue
ofaccordingmoreconsistently
withthedemocraticimpulsethat
has animatedhis life'swork. An argumentframedin termsof
what is desirableforthe communityleaves it to the demos to
determinehow theeconomyshouldbe structured
and what the
and
duties
of
and
rights
employers employeesoughttobe,without
theimpedimentto popularsovereignty
ofmoral-rights
claims.If
we take this approach, the distributionof power in the firm
becomesan open question,and we can betteraccommodatethe
need fordiversityand experimentation
thantheone-size-fits-all
solutionofmoralrights.
This is in facttheapproachDahl tookto thequestionbefore
he worked out his theoryof proceduraldemocracy.In Politics,
andWelfare,
he and CharlesLindblomarguedthatwith
Economics,
"theredo notseemtobe any
regardtothegovernanceofthefirm,
49. Dahl, Preface
toEconomic
Democracy,
pp. 84-110.
50. For a powerfuldefenseof workplacedemocracyon consequentialist
groundssee Schweickart,
AgainstCapitalism,
pp. 88-136;fora moreskepticalview
see HenryHansmann,TheOwnership
ofEnterprise
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
reflections
on thepossiblecostsofmandatory
Press,1996),pp. 66-119.Forfurther
democratization
offirmssee RobertMayer,"Is therea MoralRighttoWorkplace
andPractice
26 (2000):22-25.
Democracy?"SocialTheory
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one organizational
a priorigroundsforpreferring
formtoanother
or forprescribingany single solution forevery enterprise."51
Dahl claimedthatin a rational
Likewise,in AftertheRevolution?
firms
the
of
society governance
would be looked upon as a concrete,practicalquestion to be decided
aftertakingintoaccounttheparticularcircumstancesof the enterprise.
Depending on these circumstances,the governmentof the enterprise
forms.Justas people in such a societywould
could takemany different
thinkit irrationalto believe thatone formof democracy is invariably
preferableto theothers,so theywould thinkitfoolishto decide a priori
thatone formforgoverningeconomicenterpriseis preferableto others
in all circumstances.52

was lost from
This rejectionof a priorisolutions,unfortunately,
sight as Dahl sought to devise forhis vision of a democratic
economy "a strongerjustification,one with a more Kantian
is in
flavor.""3Butas we have seen,thatneo-Kantianjustification
fact more vulnerable to refutationthan the consequentialist
argumentit displaced.

51. Dahl and Lindblom,Politics,
Economics
andWelfare,
p. 477.
52. Dahl,After
theRevolution?,
pp. 116-17.Fora morerecentexpressionofthe
same view see "Social Realityand 'FreeMarkets':A Letterto Friendsin Eastern
Europe,"Dissent37 (1990):227.
53. Dahl,Preface
toEconomic
Democracy,
p. 111.
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